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This paper analyses the effects of the recent reform of the Estatuto da Aposentação, 
applicable to the contributors of the Caixa Geral de Aposentações (CGA). Using the 
“2005  Public  Administration  Human  Resources  Database”,  a  simulation  exercise  is 
undertaken  in  order  to  evaluate  the  impact  of  the  reform  on  the  time-profile  of 
retirements, initial pensions and CGA pension-related expenditure. The results show 
that the reform has heterogeneous effects, but, for most public employees, it results in 
an extension of the contributory career and a decrease in initial pensions, generating a 
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1. Introduction                   
The convergence of the public employees’ pension system, the Caixa Geral de 
Aposentações  (CGA),  to  the  rules  applicable  to  private  sector  employees  started  in 
1993. It was then established that the pensions of the CGA contributors enrolled since 
September  1993  should  be  computed  using  the  formula  that  applies  to  the  General 
Social Security System (GSSS). More recently, the convergence has been accelerated 
and was extended to public employees registered in the CGA before September 1993, as 
stipulated  in  Law  No.  60/2005  of  December  29.
1  In  fact,  the  public  employees’ 
retirement requirements and pension formulas were subject to a substantial revision, 
given  the  need  to  bring  sustainable  foundations  to  the  social  security  system.  The 
revision  came  into  force  in January  2006    (it  was  later  complemented  by  Law  No. 
60/2005 of December 29, Law No. 52/2007 of August 31, and Law No. 11/2008 of 
February 20).  
The purpose of this study is to analyse the effects of the reform of the Estatuto 
da Aposentação (the Retirement Statute for CGA contributors) on the time-profile of 
retirements, initial old-age pensions and CGA pension-related expenditure (from 2006 
until the system closes, as it will, given that the enrolment of new public employees in 
the  CGA  ceased  in  December  2005).  More  specifically,  the  idea  is  to  quantify  the 
impact of three factors: the rise in the age and career-length required to qualify for a full 
pension; the change in the formulas used to calculate initial pensions, including the 
introduction of a sustainability factor; and the revision or elimination of special regimes 
applicable to some CGA contributors. 
In order to do so, it was used the “2005 Public Administration Human Resources 
Database”, made available by the Direcção Geral da Administração Pública (DGAP). 
This dates from the specific point when the new legislation came into force (December 
2005). On the basis of the information regarding age, years of service and professional 
category, it is simulated for each public employee the retirement year, both under the 
current and the previous version of the Estatuto da Aposentação. Then the initial old-
age  pensions  (including  the  applicable  sustainability  factor,  based  on  average  life 
expectancy at retirement year) and the CGA pension-related expenditure are estimated. 
It was assumed that retirement only occurs when contributors qualify for receiving a full 
pension (or when they reach the age limit). Therefore, the more recent change in the 
                                                 
1 In Appendix 1 an enumeration of the legislation used for this study is presented. 3 
Estatuto  da  Aposentação  that  reduced  the  minimum  career-length  required  for 
retirement is not relevant for this exercise, since it implies receiving a partial pension. 
This  study  does  not  aim  to  predict  the  profile  of  retirements  of  CGA 
contributors.  In  fact,  in  the  past  an  important  number  of  contributors  retired  before 
completing all the conditions required to be entitled to a full pension, on the basis of 
personal  choices  or  specific  reasons,  such  as  disability.  Moreover,  some  CGA 
contributors are not public employees.
2 There is also no attempt to carry out a welfare 
exercise regarding the employees affected by the legislative reform. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines the database and the 
changes introduced to ensure its suitability for this study’s purpose. Section 3 illustrates 
the  methodology,  highlighting  the  modifications  to  the  retirement  conditions  and 
pension formulas introduced by the new legislation. It also describes the procedure used 
to calculate a career advancement profile for each professional category, based on the 
estimated relationship between service length and wage in December 2005. In section 4 
the  results  of  the  simulation  are  discussed.  Finally,  section  5  presents  the  main 
conclusions. 
 
2. The 2005 Public Administration Human Resources Database 
2.1. Preliminary procedures  
This  database  comprises  information  dated  from  December  2005,  including 
variables that allow to classify public employees in a variety of categories. In terms of 
central  government,  it  does  not  include  military  personnel  and  data  on  judges  are 
incomplete. Furthermore, it does not cover the regional government employees of the 
Região Autónoma dos Açores (RAA) and the information on local government workers 
is only partial. 
  The  information  for  the  RAA  was  obtained  from  the  Ficheiro  Central  de 
Pessoal  do  Governo  Regional  dos  Açores  (also  dated  from  December  2005),  made 
available by the DGAP. This file contains data concerning the employees’ professional 
category,  gender,  age,  legal  nature  of  the  labour  relationship,  years  of  service  and 
education. However, there is no information about wages or cross-tabulations for most 
key variables, except age by gender. In order to overcome this limitation, and starting 
                                                 
2 Note also that although the database covers almost all CGA contributors working for general government entities, it 
does not exactly match it (see below). 4 
from the latter tabulation, the structure for the relevant variables for the employees of 
the Região Autónoma da Madeira was replicated using the RAA data. 
In  order  to  approximate  the  local  government  and  judges’  data  (military 
personnel  were  excluded  from  the  study),  the  “1999  Public  Administration  Human 
Resources  Database”  was  used.  It  was  updated  by  simulating  the  retirements  that 
occurred between 2000 and 2005 in terms of the rules in force during that period.
3 
However,  for  local  government,  the  strict  application  of  the  retirement  rules  led  to 
retirement  flows  smaller  than  those  that  actually  occurred  (according  to  statistics 
published by the CGA). This arises from the fact that many public employees retire 
earlier (for instance, due to disability).  To bring results closer to reality, 65 years was 
assumed as the age limit (instead of 70 years), since for the age group from 65 to 70 
years disability-based retirement seems more likely. The individuals who in each year 
fulfilled the prerequisites were excluded from the database. Moreover, the observations 
corresponding to the employees hired from 2000 to 2005 were created in line with the 
available  data.  In  the  case  of  local  government,  the  variables  professional  category, 
labour relationship, gender, education and age were created for these new employees by 
reference to the structure observed for those hired in the five years prior to 2000. 
Note  that  it  is  necessary  to  know  the  wages  received  by  each  employee 
throughout their contributory career, in order to compute the retirement pensions. A 
wage progression profile was estimated for each professional category (as explained in 
section 3.2.2) on the basis of the December 2005 information for central government 
and Região Autónoma da Madeira. These profiles were assumed to be also suitable for 
the cases of local government and the RAA. For the judges, a similar procedure was 
undertaken, but based on the relationship between length of service and salary reported 
in the December 1999 database. The estimated wages were then adjusted in line with 
the across-the-board updates between 2000 and 2005. 
 
2.2. Data treatment 
The  information  for  the  different  sub-sectors  (central,  regional  and  local 
government) was put together into a single database comprising roughly 700 thousand 
observations. The data were then treated, starting with the exclusion of the observations 
                                                 
3 Until December 2003, public employees could retire as long as they had a career-length of 36 years and there was 
no inconvenience from the viewpoint of the service (Decree-Law No. 116/85 of 19 April).  Since January 2004 
penalty-free retirement is only possible upon reaching the age of 60 and a career-length of 36 years (Law No. 1/2004 
of 15 January). 5 
referring to individuals whose age was either unknown or above 72 years in December 
2005. The years of service of the individuals for whom the difference between age and 
this variable implied that they would have been hired before the age of 15 were not 
considered. The same happened with the salaries on the left of the 1
st or on the right of 
the 99
th percentiles, assumed to be errors in the data. However, it should be stressed 
that, in both cases, these observations were not eliminated. The same applies to the ones 
referring to individuals whose salary was unknown because, as already mentioned, the 
simulation exercise is based on estimated wage progression profiles. 
Career-length, when unknown, was estimated on the basis of the employees’ 
age, using the following rule: 
·  if in December 2005 the reported age was higher than the average enrolment 
age, career-length is given by the difference between those variables; 
·  if in December 2005 the reported age was lower than the average enrolment age, 
career-length is assumed to be zero. 
In addition to these issues, it was detected the existence of employees occupying 
more than one position in the public administration and, as a consequence, with more 
than  one  observation  in  the  database.  In  these  cases,  the  maximum  career-length 
reported and the corresponding professional category were selected. If this procedure 
did not allow for only one category to be picked up, the choice was made at random. 
 
2.3. Delimitation and description of the relevant group of contributors 
  The reform of the Estatuto da Aposentação did not affect the workers who met 
the requirements for obtaining a full pension by 31 December 2005. These were not 
taken into account in the exercise. Additionally, as the simulation is only applicable to 
public administration employees enrolled in the CGA, it was necessary to separate them 
from those registered in the GSSS. Since there is no information in the database about 
which of the two entities the worker belongs to, it was considered, as an approximation, 
that the enrolment in the CGA corresponds to the labour relationships resulting from 
appointments,  administrative  fixed-term  contracts  and  administrative  fixed-term 
teaching contracts (Chart 1). The simulation exercise was implemented for this group, 
consisting of about 612 thousand individuals.
4 
                                                 
4 This group, in addition to the individuals who already met the requirements for obtaining a full pension in 2005, 
adds up to roughly 617 thousand employees. The number of CGA contributors working in the public administration 














   Furthermore, it is relevant to distinguish the individuals belonging to the so-
called general CGA regime from the ones enrolled in the special regimes. The 
distinction was made by reference to the reported professional category (Chart 2). The 
special regimes considered in the exercise are those aplicable to security force members 
(GNR and PSP)
5, primary education and kindergarten teachers, and nurses. These cover 
the majority of the public employees enrolled in the CGA but not included in its general 
regime (see Chart 3 for the contributors’ distribution by these professional categories). 
Finally,  it  is  also  important  to  establish  the  contributors’  enrolment  date, 
specifically  whether  it  occurred  prior  to  September  1993,  since  this  determines  a 
different formula for pension calculation. The career-length reported by the majority of 
the individuals included in the simulation exercise (59 per cent) implies a registration 









                                                 
5 Guarda Nacional Republicana and Polícia de Segurança Pública, respectively. 
Chart 1 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES ENROLLED IN THE CGA 









Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Chart 2 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES ENROLLED IN THE 






















3. Simulation exercise methodology 
3.1. Simulation of the annual number of retirements 
Part of the effects of the revision of the Estatuto da Aposentação refers to the 
postponement of retirement. Hence, a first step was to simulate the annual number of 
retirements under the legislation in force until December 2005 and since January 2006. 
Following the reform, for every CGA contributor, the minimum age required to 
retire with a penalty-free pension rises gradually from 60 to 65 years, at a 6 months per 
year rate, during a transitional period that goes from 2006 to 2015 (see Table 2.1.1, in 
Appendix 2).
6 For the employees whose enrolment date was prior to September 1993, 
the number of years of service corresponding to a full contributory career also rises at a 
6 month per year rate, from 36 to 40 years, between 2006 and 2013 (Table 2.1.2, in 
Appendix 2). Regarding the contributors enrolled since September 1993, a career-length 
of 40 years remains the minimum required to warrant a full pension, since the GSSS 
pension computing rules were already applicable to them before the legislative reform. 
It should be stressed that individual preferences play an important role in the 
choice of the retirement moment within the legal framework. The factors influencing 
this choice are subjective, hence considering them in a simulation is difficult. In the 
performed exercise it was therefore assumed that public employees retire when they 
fulfil all the requirements to receive a full pension or reach the age limit (70 years, for 
                                                 
6 There is the possibility of reducing this minimum age limit, benefiting contributors with a relatively longer length of 
service. 
Chart 3 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES ENROLLED IN THE MAIN 
SPECIAL CGA REGIMES 










Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Chart 4 












Source: Authors’ calculations. 8 
general  CGA  regime  contributors).  As  mentioned,  there  are  public  employees  that 
belong to special regimes and may retire on the basis of different conditions than those 
applicable in the general CGA regime. For further details about these conditions, see 
section 4.2. 
In  order  to  simulate  the  profile  of  retirements,  it  was  prepared  an  algorithm 
based on the legal retirement conditions for the general and the special CGA regimes. 












Agei = age of individual i in a given year. 
Career-lengthi = career-length of individual i in a given year. 
At = Minimum age required to qualify for a penalty-free pension in year t. 
Clt = Minimum career-length required to qualify for a full pension in year t. 
 
3.2. Simulation of the initial old-age pensions 
3.2.1. Pension calculation 
·  Public employees enrolled until 31 August 1993 
  Prior to 31 December 2005 the pension computing formula applicable to CGA 







= , where:  
RCL = monthly wage received in the last position held (reference compensation). 
C = length of service, with an upper limit of 36 years. 
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RCL = monthly wage in the last position held (first component reference compensation). 
If retirement occurs from 1 January 2008 onwards, this amount has an upper 
limit given by 12 times the Indexante dos Apoios Sociais (IAS).
7 
C1 = length of service up to December 2005. 
C = length of service required to warrant a full pension, which varies between 36.5 and 
40 years (see Table 2.1.2 in Appendix 2). 
RCA = average wage over the best C2 contributory years since 1 January 2006 (second 
component reference compensation).  
C2 = length of service since 1 January 2006 required to build up a full contributory 
career. 
r2 = annual pension accrual rate applicable to the second component. 
  The r2 rate is linked to retirement year, length of service and amount of the 
reference compensation. It was equal to 2% for employees retired by December 2007 
and this value is still in force for retirements taking place after that date, as long as the 
individuals  have  20  or  less  years  of  contributions.
8  Otherwise,  the  accrual  rate  is  a 
function of the reference compensation. It varies between 2% and 2.3%, in line with a 
regressive bracket mechanism indexed to the mandatory minimum wage (or IAS)
9, as 
indicated in Table 2.3.1 in Appendix 2.  
  From January 2008 onwards, the pensions awarded to contributors enrolled until 





                                                 
7 All financial variables in this exercise are expressed at 2005 prices, including the IAS. However, since in 2005 the 
IAS had not yet been created, it was assumed that its value corresponded to the mandatory minimum wage then in 
force (374.70 euros). 
8 As set down in Law No. 60/2005 of 29 December, the 2% rate should be applicable to individuals who retired until 
December 2015. However, Law No. 52/2007 of 31 August brought forward the changeover to a variable annual 
pension accrual rate.  
9 Until 31 May 2007 the pension accrual rate was linked to the mandatory minimum wage, whilst after this date it is 
computed  taking  the  IAS  as  a  reference  (Decree  Law  187/2007  of  10  May).  However,  for  the  exercise  it  was 
considered that this rule has been in force only since 1 January 2008. 
10 The sustainability factor is given by the ratio between the average life expectancy at 65 years in 2006 and the 
average life expectancy at 65 in the year before the pension is paid for the first time. 10 
·  Public employees enrolled since 1 September 1993 
  For public employees registered since September 1993, pensions are computed, 
as previously, using the formulas applicable in the GSSS. These formulas were revised 
for  the  last  time  in  2007.  For  contributors  whose  enrolment  took  place  between  1 
September 1993 and 31 December 2001 and who retire by December 2016, pension is 
the weighted average of two components:  
1 2 1 2
1 1 2 2
, with
1    and    2 , where: A A
P C P C
Pension
TC
P RC r C P RC r C
× + ×
=
= ´ ´ = ´ ´
 
 
C1 =  length of service up to December 2006. 
C2  =  length  of  service  since  January  2007  required  to  build  up  a  full  contributory 
career.
11 
TC = overall career-length. 
1 A RC =  average  wage  over  the  best  10  out  of  the  last  15  contributory  years  (first 
component reference compensation).  
r1 = annual pension accrual rate applicable to the first component, which is equal to 2%.  
C = length of service, with an upper limit of 40 years. 
2 A RC = average wage over the total contributory career, or over the best 40 contributory 
years if number of years served exceeds that length (second component reference 
compensation). 
r2 = annual pension accrual rate applicable to the second component. For employees 
with 20 years of contributions or less, it corresponds to 2%. For the remaining 
contributors  it  varies  between  2%  and  2.3%  in  line  with  the  abovementioned 
bracket mechanism. 
   





                                                 
11 In the exercise, for the determination of the weights, C1 and C2, it was considered a maximum length of service of 
40 years (i.e. it was assumed that TC C = ). Hence, for employees with a full career-length,  2 40 1. C C = -  
 11 
Case 1: 
1 2 1 2
1 2 1
2
1 2 1 2
1 2 1
2
If ( and 12 and 12 ) or
( and 12 ):
1 1 2 2
, where   1 12    and    2 .
A A A A
A A A
A
RC r C RC r C RC r C IAS RC r C IAS
RC r C RC r C RC r C IAS
P C P C
Pension P IAS P RC r C
TC
´ ´ > ´ ´ ´ ´ > × ´ ´ £ ×
´ ´ = ´ ´ ´ ´ > ×
× + ×
= = × = ´ ´
 
Case 2: 
1 2 1 2
2
1 2 1 2
2
If ( and 12 and 12 ):
.
A A A A
A
RC r C RC r C RC r C IAS RC r C IAS
Pension RC r C
´ ´ > ´ ´ ´ ´ > × ´ ´ > ×
= ´ ´
 
  For contributors enrolled until 31 December 2001 but who retire from 1 January 
2017 onwards, the formula is the same. However, in this case, the first weight (C1) 
refers to the service completed up to 31 December 2001 and the second (C2) to the 
subsequent contributory years. 
Finally, for CGA members enrolled since 1 January 2002, initial pensions are 
calculated in terms of the following formula: 
A Pension RC r C = ´ ´ , where:                  
RCA = average wage over the total contributory career, or over the best 40 contributory 
years  if  the  number  of  years  served  exceeds  that  length  (reference 
compensation). 
C = length of service, with an upper limit of 40 years. 
r = annual pension accrual rate, which varies between 2% and 2.3% in line with the 
bracket mechanism. 
 
  From  January  2008  onwards,  the  pensions  of  the  employees  enrolled  since 
September 1993 result from the product of the outcome of the formulas above by a 
sustainability factor. 
 
3.2.2. Computation of the reference compensation 
  In order to simulate the amount of the initial pensions, it is necessary to know all 
the variables included in the formulas presented in the previous sub-section. The length 
of service and age required to be eligible for a full pension are determined by law, while 
the age and number of contributory years at retirement are an output of the simulation 
exercise. However, there is no information on the actual wages received throughout the 12 
contributory career, and thus it is not possible to compute directly the different values of 
the reference compensation. As an alternative, the salary earned in each contributory 
year was estimated using regressions of the wage on the service length in December 













For each professional category the following regression was estimated: 
1 5 33 37 ln ... i i i i MW C C a b b x = + × + + × + , where: 
 
MWi is the monthly wage earned by individual i in December 2005. 





1, if career-length  in December 2005
 ,    5,6,...,36












1, if career-length 37 in December 2005
    
0, if career-length 37 in December 2005
i C
³ 
=  < 
 
 
Given that in the initial and the final years of each career it is typically difficult to 
estimate an accurate profile, the first four years, as well as the ones beyond the 36
th, 
                                                 
12 The following categories were considered: administrative staff, administrative court staff, auxiliary staff, craft 
workers, doctors, judges, medical support staff, nurses, other court staff, professionals, other professionals, prison 
guards, security forces – higher ranks, security forces – lower ranks, teachers, technical staff, university teachers, 
others – with university degree, and others – without university degree. 
Chart 5 














Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 13 
were aggregated. Thus, the estimated coefficients capture the difference between the 
average earnings over the first four years and in each of the following years, until the 
end  of  the  contributory  career.  Since  the  progression  profile  resulting  from  this 
estimation  procedure  was  somewhat  irregular,  it  was  smoothed  by  means  of  a 
polynomial adjustment on the estimated wages using a third degree polynomial in the 
years of service. It was assumed that the salary remained constant upon reaching the 
respective maximum or, at the latest, by the 36
th year. The results are illustrated in Chart 
6.  
 The  wage  progression  profiles  reflect  the  relationship  between  earnings  and 
seniority that was observed in 2005, meaning that the simulated pensions are also at 
2005 prices.
13 Note that, even in real terms, the relationship between wages and years of 
service estimated for 2005 is different from the relationships that prevailed in the past 
and will prevail in future, since real wages change frequently. This effect should be 
reinforced by the ongoing revision of the public administration pay schedule. However, 
it should be stressed that discrepancies vis-a-vis the 2005 wage level and/or progression 
profile have a similar impact on the simulated pensions, in terms of both the previous 
and  the  current  legal  frameworks.  As  the  results  presented  always  refer  to  the 
differential effect of the legislative reform, the procedure followed should provide a 














                                                 
13 The annual wages used to calculate the reference compensation were not updated in line with retirement year’s 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: For each professional category, the lower line refers to the salary at the beginning of the career and the upper line concerns the 
salary at its end. Therefore, the wider the amplitude between these two lines, the lower will be the initial salary as a proportion of the 
final  one.  The  intermediate,  dotted,  line  shows  the  moment  in  which  80  per  cent  of  the  final  wage  is  reached,  measuring  the 
advancement pace. 
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4. Results             
4.1. Impact on the profile of retirements and initial pension for the general 
CGA regime  
4.1.1. Time-profile of retirements
14  
In the exercise performed, a first step was the comparison between the profile of 
retirements  resulting  from  the  legislation  in  force  before  and  after  December  2005 
(Charts 7 and 8). The most obvious effect is a shift to the right in the flows referring to 
the  public  employees  enrolled  before  September  1993.  Such  an  effect  becomes 
progressively stronger during the transition to the new rules, and it stabilizes at the end 
of  that  period,  in  2014-2015.  While  a  rise  in  retirements  is  projected  for  the  years 
subsequent to 2006 under both versions of legislation, this is less marked under the new 
one (Chart 8). Such increase in the number of new retirees reflects the large number of 
workers admitted to public administration entities in the period following the April 25, 
1974, revolution. In Chart 8, the increase in the flow spreads until about 2018, while in 















                                                 
14 The CGA has made available the figures referring to retirements in 2006 and 2007. As mentioned, the population 
of CGA members is broader than the one considered in this study and there is a substantial number of early and 
disability-based retirements. Even correcting for these factors, the simulation underestimates (by about 25 per cent) 
the actual flows for the two-year period. Presumably this stems from the fact that the service length reported in the 
database  by  some  employees  may  fall  short of  the  relevant  years  of  service  (because  it  does  not  comprise,  for 
instance,  military  service  or  the  time  served  in  entities  later  incorporated  into  public  administration).  This 
phenomenon does not jeopardize an evaluation of the effects of the legislative reform.  
Chart 7 
PROFILE OF RETIREMENTS – LEGISLATION IN FORCE UNTIL DECEMBER 2005 
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Another  consequence  of  the  revision  of  the  Estatuto  da  Aposentação  is  the 
elimination of the break in the number of new retirees between 2029 and 2033 that 
would have happened if there had not been a reform (Chart 7). This break would have 
resulted  from  the  existence  of  different  career-length  requirements  in  the  previous 
legislation, depending on registration date. Indeed, in terms of the legislation in force 
until 2005, the CGA contributors enrolled since September 1993 needed 40 years of 
service to qualify for a full pension, rather than 36. Hence, in the projection performed 
under the previous legislation most of the employees registered before September 1993 
would already have retired by 2029, while those registered afterwards would not have 
fulfilled 40 years of service before 2033.
15   
  Chart 9 shows the difference between the flows of retirements, before and after 
the revision of the Estatuto da Aposentação (computed from the preceding charts). It is 
noticeable that the shift to the right in the profile of retirements for employees enrolled 
before  September  1993  generates  a  non-negligible  decrease  in  the  number  of  new 
retirees in the 10 years following the introduction of the new legislation. This decrease 
is then offset in the decade subsequent to 2025. Finally, for the individuals registered in 
                                                 
15 The number of public employees enrolled since September 1993 who retire before 2033 is quite small and refers, 
with no exception, to individuals who reach the age limit. 
Chart 8 
PROFILE OF RETIREMENTS – LEGISLATION IN FORCE SINCE JANUARY 2006 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 17 
the CGA since September 1993, the legislative reform consists only in a rise in the 
minimum  age  required  for  receiving  a  penalty-free  pension,  from  60  to  65  years. 
Therefore, although there is a similar change in the profile of retirements, its magnitude 
















4.1.2. Retirement moment and initial pensions
16 
·  Public employees enrolled until 31 August 1993 
Chart 10 shows the average delay in the retirement year and variation in the 
pension amount as a consequence of the revision of the Estatuto da Aposentação, for 
employees whose registration date is prior to September 1993. The retirees are grouped 
by retirement year in terms of the previous legislation. 
Chart 10 demonstrates that the reform of the Estatuto da Aposentação results, in 
general,  in  the  postponement  of  retirement  for  the  general  CGA  regime  employees 
enrolled  until  31  August  1993.  On  average,  the  delay  corresponds  to  3.5  years  and 
increases gradually during the transitional period, stabilizing around 4 years from 2015 
on. No employees retire earlier than they would have under the previous legislation and 
most of them (87 per cent) serve more time in public administration. Most of those 
work  4  or  5  more  years  in  order  to  fulfil  the  new  requirements  (Chart  11).  The 
                                                 
16 This section does not take into account the sustainability factor. The impact of its introduction will be analysed 
later, in Section 4.3. 
Chart 9 
PROFILE OF RETIREMENTS – IMPACT OF THE REFORM OF THE ESTATUTO DA 
APOSENTAÇÃO 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 18 
remaining employees retire when reaching the age limit; hence, for them the retirement 




















As  far  as  the  pension  amount  is  concerned,  the  simulation  leads  to  the 
conclusion that the average initial pension for contributors enrolled until 31 August 
1993  tends  to  be  lower  when  calculated  under  the  revised  legislation.  The  average 
decrease becomes more noticeable the further from 2005 the retirement takes place. 
This happens because the weight of the second component in total pension increases 
over time, and a comparatively larger proportion of the pension is based on the average 
earnings of the whole career. Nonetheless, the effects of the reform of the Estatuto da 
Aposentação  are  relatively  heterogeneous.  Indeed,  even  though  initial  pensions  in 
general decrease, this does not happen for approximately 20 per cent of the employees. 





IMPACT OF THE REFORM OF THE ESTATUTO DA APOSENTAÇÃO 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: The horizontal shift represents the average postponement of the retirement moment, whilst the vertical one 
measures the variation in the average initial pension. Only those individuals whose retirement takes place before 
2029 were considered, since from that year onwards the number of retirements is small.  
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In order to explain how the legislative reform influences the initial pension, a 
breakdown of its variation in terms of the contribution of the relevant variables was 
undertaken.  
 
Breakdown of the change in the initial pension
17 
The formula applicable before the legislative reform was rewritten as the sum of 
two components ( 1
P P and  2






P P P P P P P
L L L L
P P
P RC C RC C r r RC C r RC C = ´ ´ = ´ ´ = ´ ´ + ´ ´ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿, where: 
RCL  is  the  reference  compensation,  corresponding  to  the  monthly  wage  in  the  last 
position held.  
C
P is the length of service required to warrant a full pension, which is equal to 36 years. 
C1 is the length of service up to December 2005. 
C2
P is the length of service since January 2006 required to build up a full contributory 
career (36 years). 
r
P is the annual pension accrual rate implicit in both components, which is given by 




                                                 
17 The breakdowns presented in this paper rely on the assumption that the individuals retire with a full pension, thus 
excluding the ones who retire when they reach the age limit. 
Chart 11 
POSTPONEMENT OF RETIREMENT 






































Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Chart 12 
RELATIVE DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN THE 
INITIAL PENSIONS COMPUTED UNDER THE 
PREVIOUS AND THE CURRENT LEGISLATION 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 20 
Since 1 January 2006, the amount of the pension for these employees is calculated 
using a formula that can be also written as the sum of two components ( 1
N P  and 2






N N N N N N L
A L A N
P P
RC C
P RC r C RC r C RC r C
C
´ ´
= + ´ ´ = ´ ´ + ´ ´ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿, where: 
RCL is the first component reference compensation, corresponding to the monthly wage 
in the last position held.
18 
1





C1 is the length of service up to December 2005 (which does not change with the legal 
reform). 
RCA   is the second component reference compensation, corresponding to the average 
wage over the best C2
N contributory years since January 2006.  
2
N r is  the  annual  pension  accrual  rate  applicable  to  the  second  component,  which  is 
linked to reference compensation and career-length. 
C
N is the length of service required to warrant a full pension, which varies between 36.5 
and 40 years (see Table 2.1.2). 
C2




Hence,  the  difference  between  the  initial  pension  computed  in  terms  of  the 
previous and current legislation (P
P and P
N, respectively) can be presented as: 
2 1
1 1 2 2 ( ) ( ) , 
P P
N P N P N P
P
d d
d P P P P P P = - = - + - ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ where: 
1 1 1 1 1 ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( )
N P N P N P
P L L L d P P r RC C r RC C RC C r r = - = ´ ´ - ´ ´ = ´ × -   represents  the 
differential explained by the first component, due to the difference between the 
implicit pension accrual rates (the other elements do not change); 
2 2 2
N P
P d P P = -  is the differential explained by the second component, which can be split 
into: 
                                                 
18 Since it was assumed that, from the 36
th year of the contributory career onwards the wage remained constant, the 
wage in the last position held is the same, in terms of both the current and the previous legislation. 21 
1.
2 2 2 ( 2 ) ( 2 ) ( 2 ) ( )
N N P N N N P
r A A A d r RC C r RC C RC C r r = ´ ´ - ´ ´ = ´ × - , 
referring to the impact of the change in the accrual rate applicable; 
2.
2 ( 2 ) ( 2 ) ( 2 ) ( )
P N P N P N
RC A L A L d r RC C r RC C r C RC RC = ´ ´ - ´ ´ = ´ × - ,  corres-
ponding to the effect of the change in the reference compensation; 
3. 2 ( 2 ) ( 2 ) ( ) ( 2 2 )
P N P P P N P
C L L L d r RC C r RC C r RC C C = ´ ´ - ´ ´ = ´ × - ,  reflecting 
the  impact  of  the  change  in  the  length  of  service  corresponding  to  a  full 
contributory career. 
 
Chart  13  presents  this  breakdown  (with  the  individuals  grouped  by  the 


















 The changes in the calculation of the reference compensation tend to result in a 
lower pension. Indeed, since 1 January 2006, there are two reference compensations, 
one for each of the pension’s components. For the first component, the wage received in 
the last position held remains relevant and it does not change. For the second, it is 
relevant  the  average  wage  over  the  best  years  subsequent  to  2005  (considering  the 
service length necessary to build up a full contributory career). This average wage tends 
Chart 13 
BREAKDOWN OF THE AVERAGE CHANGE IN INITIAL PENSIONS 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 22 
Chart 14 
SECOND COMPONENT ANNUAL PENSION 
ACCRUAL RATE 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
to be lower than the last salary received, which was the reference under the formula 
previously in force. 
 As for the impact of the changes in the pension accrual rates, this is always 
negative. In fact, the applicable rate under the previous legislation was 2.5%, whilst the 
ones introduced by the revision of the Estatuto da Aposentação are lower.
19 Chart 14 















It is worth noting that the impacts related to the first component become less 
relevant  as  the  retirement  year  moves  away  from  2005,  as  they  affect  a  smaller 
proportion of the overall pension.  The opposite holds for the impacts related to the 
second component. This phenomenon explains why the difference between the pensions 
computed in line with the current and the previous legislation increases as retirement 
draws further from 2005 (as suggested in Chart 10).   
Finally, the variation in the career-length has a positive influence on pension 
amounts. As previously shown in Chart 11, most public employees will extend their 
service period to fulfil the new requirements. For most of them, the impact of such an 
extension  is  more  than  offset  by  that  of  the  other  factors  working  in  the  opposite 
direction, and the pension diminishes when computed in terms of the new formula. 
Nevertheless, in some cases, the career-length extension, combined with the new annual 
                                                 
19 The first component accrual rate corresponds to the ratio between 0.9 and the years of service equivalent to a full 
career, which rise from 36 to 40 (Table 2.1.2 in Appendix 2). The second component rate varies between 2% and 
2.3%. 23 
rates, may result in global accrual rates that are higher than the previous maximum.
20 
When this happens, the pension computed under the revised version of the Estatuto da 
Aposentação may be higher than the amount resulting from the previous formula, even 
though the reference compensation and the annual pension accrual rates decrease. These 
conditions are observed for about 20 per cent of CGA contributors whose enrolment 
took place until 31 August 1993. 
 


















In Chart 15 it is noticeable that the revision of the Estatuto da Aposentação has a 
more limited effect for the public employees enrolled in the general CGA regime since 
September 1993. In this case, the only modification was the rise in the minimum age for 
penalty-free retirement, from 60 to 65 years. This rise in the age requirement tends to 
imply the extension of the contributory career and a consequential delay in retirement. 
However, it was observed that such a delay amounts to less than 6 months on average, 
                                                 
20 The global accrual rate is the product between the annual pension accrual rate and the relevant number of years of 
service. In the previous legislation it was equal to 90 per cent (2.5% multiplied by 36). In the new legal framework, it 
is determined by the sum of the product between the first component rate and the career-length up to December 2005 
and the product between the second component rate and the subsequent years of service. 
Chart 15 
IMPACT OF THE REFORM OF THE ESTATUTO DA APOSENTAÇÃO 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: The horizontal shift represents the average postponement of the retirement moment, whilst the 
vertical one measures the variation in the average initial pension. 24 
whilst  the  minimum  age  goes  up  by  5  years.  This  discrepancy  is  justified  by  the 
existence of a large number of contributors who would retire with more than 60 years of 
age, even under the previous legal framework,  in order to fulfil the 40-year career-
length requirement. Therefore, for these employees, the postponement of the retirement 
moment is not very significant. 
Additionally,  since  the  formula  for  computing  initial  pensions  has  remained 
unchanged, the impact on pensions is minor (notice, however, that it is now positive due 
to the increase in the reference compensation, as it will be seen). Indeed, for about 80 
per cent of the contributors enrolled since September 1993, the introduction of the new 
legislation has a nil or almost nil effect on career-length and pension amounts. For the 
others, there is an observable extension of the career-length and an increase in the old-
age pensions (Charts 16 and 17). In order to analyse these results, a breakdown of the 
change in pensions was undertaken. This is similar to the one previously presented for 



















POSTPONEMENT OF RETIREMENT 




































Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Chart 17 
RELATIVE DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN THE 
INITIAL PENSIONS COMPUTED UNDER THE 
PREVIOUS AND THE CURRENT LEGISLATION 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Breakdown of the change in the initial pension 
  For the contributors whose enrolment in the CGA took place between September 
1993 and December 2001, the computing formula stipulated in the previous legislation 
(P
A) may be presented as the sum of two components ( 1








1 ( ) 2 ( )
( 1) ( 2) ,
P P
P P P
A A P P P P
A A
P P
C RC r C C RC r C
P RC r C RC r C
C
´ ´ ´ + ´ ´ ´
= = ´ ´ + ´ ´




A RC  is the first component reference compensation, corresponding to the average wage 
over the best 10 out of the last 15 contributory years.
 
r1 is the annual pension accrual rate applicable to the first component, which is equal to 
2% (it did not change with the legal reform). 
C1 is the length of service up to December 2001. 
2
P
A RC  is the second component reference compensation, corresponding to the average 
wage over the best 40 years of the contributory career.
 
2
P r  is the annual pension accrual rate applicable to the second component, which is 
linked to the reference compensation and career-length. 
C2 is the length of service since January 2002 required to build up a full contributory 
career (C). 
C is the length of service required to warrant a full pension, which corresponds to 40 
years (both in terms of the new and the previous legal framework).
22 
 
  Even though the minimum career-length required for receiving a full pension 
remains unchanged, the new legal framework implies a rise in the minimum age from 
60 to 65 years. As some individuals extend their career-length, the wages taken into 
account  to  compute  the  reference  compensations  may  differ,  as  well  as  the  second 
component  accrual  rate.  Hence,  under  the  new  legislation  the  pension  amount 
corresponds to: 
                                                 
21 No individual meets the conditions leading to the alternative formulas presented in section 3.2. Moreover, since 
retirement with a full pension is assumed, the breakdown is not applicable to contributors who retire by December 
2016. Thus, the years of service up to December 2001 are the relevant ones for the first component. 
22 Remember that, when determining the weights relevant for the underlying formula, a maximum length of service of 
40 years was considered (see footnote 11).  26 
1 2
1 2
1 2 ( 1) ( 2) ,
N N
N N N N
A A
P P
P RC r C RC r C = ´ ´ + ´ ´
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
 
in which the variables have the same meaning as before, but refer to the values that 
result from the current version of the Estatuto da Aposentação. 
 
The difference between the two amounts corresponds to: 
2 1
1 1 2 2 ( ) ( )
P P
N P N P N P
P
d d
d P P P P P P = - = - + - ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ , where  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( )
N P N P N P
P A A A A d P P RC r C RC r C r C RC RC = - = ´ ´ - ´ ´ = ´ × -   is  the  dif-




P d P P = -  is the differential explained by the second component, which can be split 
into: 
1. 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 ( 2) ( 2) ( 2) ( )
N N N P N N P
r A A A d RC r C RC r C RC C r r = ´ ´ - ´ ´ = ´ × - ,  referring  to 
the change in the applicable pension accrual rate; 
2.
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 ( 2) ( 2) ( 2) ( )
N P P P P N P
RC A A A A d RC r C RC r C r C RC RC = ´ ´ - ´ ´ = ´ × - , corres-
ponding to the change in the reference compensation. 
 
  For the employees whose registration occurred since January 2002, the computing 
formula has also remained unchanged. Under the previous version of the Estatuto da 
Aposentação it was given by: 
P P P
A P RC r C = ´ ´ , where: 
P
A RC  is the reference compensation, corresponding to the average wage over the best 40 
years of the contributory career. 
P r  is the annual pension accrual rate, which is linked to reference compensation and 
career-length.  
C is the length of service required to warrant a full pension, which corresponds to 40 
years (in terms of both the current and the previous legal framework). 
 
For these employees the reform of the Estatuto da Aposentação may as well 
result in variations in the reference compensation and, as a consequence, in the annual 
accrual rate. In this case, the formula is expressed as follows: 27 
Chart 18 
BREAKDOWN OF THE AVERAGE CHANGE IN 
INITIAL PENSIONS 
CGA general regime, employees enrolled between 

































































































effect of the change in the 1st component
reference compensation
effect of the change in the 2nd component
accrual rate
effect of the change in the 2nd component
reference compensation
  Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Chart 19 
BREAKDOWN OF THE AVERAGE CHANGE IN 
INITIAL PENSIONS 
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A P RC r C = ´ ´  
in which the variables have the same meaning as before, but refer to the values that 
result from the current version of the Estatuto da Aposentação. 
 
Therefore, the difference between the two amounts corresponds to 
1 2
( ) ( )
P P
N P N N P P
P A A
d d
d P P RC r C RC r C = - = ´ ´ - ´ ´ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ , 
that can be split into: 
1. 
1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
N N P N N N P
P RC A A A A d d RC r C RC r C r C RC RC = = ´ ´ - ´ ´ = ´ × - , the impact of 
the change in the reference compensation; 
2. 
2 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
P N P P P N P
P r A A A d d RC r C RC r C RC C r r = = ´ ´ - ´ ´ = ´ × - , the impact of the 
















Charts 18 and 19 show that, for employees enrolled since September 1993, the 
difference  between  the  pensions  computed  under  the  revised  legislation  and  the 
previous  one  is  almost  exclusively  explained  by  the  change  in  the  reference 
compensation.  Given  that  employees  extend  their  career  in  order  to  fulfil  the  age 
requirement (as shown in Chart 16), the average wage over the best 10 out of the last 15 
years and the average wage over the whole career tend to be higher. This outcome has a 28 
positive  impact  on  the  pension  amount.  In  its  turn,  such  variation  in  the  reference 
compensation tends to bring down the accrual rates for the second component (for those 
enrolled until December 2001) and the overall pension (for those registered afterwards) 
– as shown in Chart 20. This effect is nonetheless small relative to that of the increase in 















4.2.  Impact  on  the  time-profile  of  retirements  and  the  initial  pension  for 
employees of the CGA special regimes 
  This  section  presents  the  impact  of  the  change  in  retirement  conditions  and 
pension formulas for the employees belonging to the most representative CGA special 
regimes:  primary  education  and  kindergarten  teachers,  nurses,  and  security  force 
employees. 
Note that for the employees of the special regimes enrolled since September 
1993  pensions  were  already  computed  using  the  formula  stipulated  for  the  GSSS. 
Nonetheless, the legislation did not specify how that rule would be implemented in 
detail.  In  the  exercise  a  career-length  requirement  of  40  years  was  assumed,  but 
proportionately reduced in line with the bonus that the legislation implicitly or explicitly 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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For the primary education  and kindergarten teachers enrolled until August 1993, 
career-length and minimum age required to warrant a full pension rise progressively 
from 30  to 40 years (with the resulting gradual elimination of the implicit bonus)
23 and 
from  55  to  65  years,  respectively  (see  Tables  2.2.2  and  2.2.3  in  Appendix  2).  The 
convergence takes place during a transitional period that ends in 2022.  In 2005 the 
maximum age until which these employees are allowed to remain in service was also 
raised from 65 to 70 years. 
  The  revision  of  the  legal  framework  for  primary  education  and  kindergarten 
teachers registered until August 1993 results in a decrease in the number of new retirees 
until 2022 (as shown in Chart 21). Afterwards, an offsetting effect takes place, and the 
flow of retirements determined by the legislation currently in force becomes higher than 
the one resulting from the previous rules. 
                                                 
23  In  the  legislation  in  force  prior  to  2005  that  defined  the  retirement  conditions  for  primary  education  and 
kindergarten teachers and nurses there was no explicit reference to a bonus in the determination of the length of 
service. However, there was an implicit one, since those employees could retire with a full pension without having 36 
years of service, as required for the contributors of the general CGA regime. This also applies to the transitional 
periods instituted by Decree-Law No. 229/2005 of December 29. 
Chart 21 
PROFILE OF RETIREMENTS – IMPACT OF THE REFORM OF THE ESTATUTO DA 
APOSENTAÇÃO 



















































Enrolled until 31 August 1993 Enrolled since 1 September 1993  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 30 
The delay in the retirement moment amounts to 7.3 years on average. In fact, the 
impact of the rise in the minimum age and career-length (10 years) is attenuated by the 
existence of the transitional period and also by an alternative that will remain in force 
until 2010, allowing retirement with full pension at 52 years of age and 32 years of 
career-length (as long as the contributor had 13 years of teaching service by October 
1989)
24.  There  is  no  change  in  retirement  year  for  contributors  retiring  under  this 
alternative.  
  The  results  for  these  contributors’  pensions  are  quite  heterogeneous.
25  For 
roughly  half  of  them,  pensions  decrease  when  computed  in  accordance  with  the 
legislation in force since January 2006. Such a decrease is on average smaller than 2 per 
cent  and  is  mostly  explained  by  the  lower  accrual  rate  and  reference  compensation 
corresponding to the period subsequent to 2005. For about 1/4 of the primary education 
and kindergarten teachers, old-age pensions are higher (by 1.8 per cent on average). 
This fact can be explained not only by the direct effect of the career-length extension on 
the pension amount (which is more marked than for the general CGA regime), but also 
by  an  indirect  effect  that  results  in  a  higher  reference  compensation  in  the  first 
component.
26 
  For the primary education and kindergarten teachers enrolled since September 
1993, the impact of the reform is also explained by the increase in the maximum and 
minimum age limits, as well as the reduction of the implicit bonus. However, in this 
case,  that  reduction  is  smaller  than  the  one  that  is  observed  for  employees  whose 
enrolment took place before. In fact, under the previous legislation a 33.3-year career-
length requirement was assumed for employees registered in the CGA since September 
1993 (corresponding to 40 years with a 36/30 bonus). 
  As shown in Chart 21, the reform of the legislation brings about a reduction in 
the number of retirees in the first decades following the introduction of the new legal 
framework (up to 2038). The average postponement in retirement stands at 7.1 years. 
For virtually all of the primary education and kindergarten teachers, the extension of the 
actual  career-length  has  a  positive  impact  on  both  reference  compensations  and, 
consequentially, on pensions (these increase by 8 per cent on average). Exceptions to 
this are the employees who retire when they reach the age limit (which was changed in 
                                                 
24 It was considered that whole contributory career of the teacher corresponds to teaching service. 
25 In order to explain the variation in the initial pensions, breakdowns following the same rationale as for the general 
CGA regime were undertaken. 
26 In fact, for contributors enrolled before September 1993, as the actual length of service is extended under the new 
legislation, the last wage (i.e. the first component reference compensation) may also be higher. 31 
2005) both under the previous and the current versions of the legislation. In these cases, 
as the applicable bonus was eliminated, the career-length used to compute the initial 
pension  decreases,  even  thought  the  actual  professional  life  is  extended  (for  these 
employees pensions decrease by approximately 0.3 per cent on average).  
 












   
 
   
 
  For  nurses  enrolled  until  August  1993,  revision  of  the  retirement  conditions 
consisted in a gradual rise in the minimum age, from 57 to 65 years, and in the career-
length required for receiving a full pension, from 35 to 40 years (see Table 2.2.4 and 
2.2.5). In Chart 22 it is noticeable that these changes result in a decrease in the number 
of retirements until 2028. From this year onwards, there is an increase that offsets the 
initial negative variation. On average, there is a 5.5-year extension in the length of 
service.  
  For more than 3/4 of the nurses enrolled until August 1993, the initial pension is 
lower (by about 3 per  cent on average) when  computed in line with the legislation 
currently  in  force.  This  basically  reflects  the  decrease  in  the  second  component 
reference compensation and in the accrual rates. On the contrary, for approximately 14 
percent of the nurses enrolled until August 1993 pensions are now higher, by 0.5 per 
cent on average. This fact can be explained by the positive impact of the career-length 
Chart 22 




















































Enrolled until 31 August 1993 Enrolled since 1 September 1993
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 32 
extension  that,  in  these  cases,  prevails  over  the  remaining  effects.  It  should  be 
highlighted that for this professional group, as the maximum wage is reached before 
completing 30 years of service (see Chart 6), the extension of the actual career-length 
does not imply additional salary gains (hence, the wage received in the last position held 
is not higher under the most recent version of the legislation). 
  Chart 22 shows that the reform has weaker effects for the nurses enrolled since 
September  1993.  For  these  individuals  the  main  change  consists  in  the  rise  in  the 
minimum age required to qualify for a penalty-free pension, from 57 to 65 years, as in 
terms of the previous legislation a 38.9-year career-length requirement was assumed 
(equivalent to 40 years computed including a 36/35 implicit bonus). Since most nurses 
would have worked beyond the age of 57 in order to fulfil that requirement, which is 
close to the one set down in the current legislation, the average delay in retirement 
caused by the reform is only 1.7 years. 
  The effects on pensions for the nurses enrolled since September 1993 are quite 
heterogeneous. For over 3/4 of them, pensions are higher under the current legislation 
(those  increase  by  2.8  per  cent  on  average).  This  outcome  stems  from  the  positive 
impact of the career-length extension on the reference compensation. For most of the 
remaining nurses, pensions are lower if computed in line with the more recent version 
of the legislation. Those typically retire when reaching the age limit, in the same year in 
both versions of legislation. Hence, their  actual career-length and the other relevant 
variables do not change. Nevertheless pension decreases (by 3 per cent on average), 



























   
  For the security force personnel (GNR and PSP) registered until August 1993, 
the legislative changes were the increase in the years of service required for receiving a 
full  pension,  from  36  to  40  (see  Table  2.1.2,  also  applicable  for  the  general  CGA 
regime), and the reduction in the bonus applied in their computation, from 25 to 15 per 
cent of the actual period of service. Additionally, access to the pre-retirement situation
27 
is now possible only upon reaching 55 years of age – besides 36 years of service. Chart 
23 shows that the changes result in a decrease in the number of new retirees until 2017. 
Then an offsetting effect takes place. 
  Most security force employees extend their careers in order to fulfil the new 
prerequisites,  thus  retirement  is  delayed,  on  average  by  3.8  years.  Those  whose 
retirement  year  does  not  change,  either  reach  the  age  limit,  or  fulfilled  the  36-year 
career-length  requirement  by  December  2005  (the  legislation  stipulates  that  the 
retirement  conditions  in  force  in  December  2005  hold  for  the  individuals  in  this 
situation). 
  For  approximately  4/5  of  the  employees  whose  registration  date  is  prior  to 
September  1993,  initial  pensions  increase  when  computed  in  terms  of  the  current 
                                                 
27 Pre-retirement is a situation similar to being in the reserves, in which employees are not on active duty. Retirement 
with a full pension is guaranteed for the individuals who spend 5 years in pre-retirement. There are transitional 
alternatives allowing access to pre-retirement on the basis of career-length and/or age requirements (see Table 2.2.1, 
concerning GNR employees). The alternatives based only on age were not taken into account for the exercise, since 
in this case pension may not be a full one.   
Chart 23 
PROFILE OF RETIREMENTS – IMPACT OF THE REFORM OF THE ESTATUTO DA APOSENTAÇÃO 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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legislation (by 4.6 per cent on average). In fact, besides the direct positive effect of the 
career-length extension (including the one stemming from the reduction of the bonus) 
on the pension amount, there may also occur an indirect one. It results from the increase 
in the relevant number of years of service that may raise the reference compensation 
associated to the last wage. This is particularly relevant for the higher ranks of the 
security forces, for which the estimated wage progression profile shows salary gains at 
the end of the contributory career (see Chart 6). For about 11 per cent of the employees 
in this professional group enrolled until August 1993, pensions are now 1.4 per cent 
lower (on average). In these cases the effect of the introduction of the new reference 
compensation referring to the period subsequent to 2005 (that tends to be lower that the 
last wage received) prevails. This impact is reinforced by the introduction of the new 
annual accrual rates. 
  In the previous legislation applying to security force employees registered since 
September 1993, a 40-year career-length was already required to warrant a full pension 
(although under the previous framework career-length was computed including a 25 per 
cent bonus, which was reduced to 15 per cent). Hence, for these individuals the effects 
of  the  reform  are  less  marked  and  more  homogenous.  Most  of  them  extend  their 
contributory  career  and  the  average  postponement  of  retirement  amounts  to 
approximately 1.8 years. This delay is essentially explained by the introduction of a 
minimum age requirement to access the pre-retirement situation. 
  For  more  than  3/4  of  the  employees  enrolled  since  September  1993,  the 
extension of the career-length brings about a rise in reference compensations and, as a 
consequence, in initial pensions. On average the latter increase by 2.4 per cent. For the 
remaining individuals, the pension formula remained unchanged and the revision of 
retirement conditions was not substantial, thus the reform has nil or almost nil effects on 
pensions. 
 
4.3. The impact of the introduction of a sustainability factor on the initial 
pension 
Since  January  2008  pensions  awarded  to  CGA  contributors  are  given  by  the 
statutory  pension  (resulting  from  the  formulas  already  presented)  multiplied  by  a 
sustainability factor. The factor is equal to the ratio between average life expectancy at 
age of 65 in 2006 and in the year before the one in which the pension is paid for the first 35 
time.  It should be stressed that the legislation  allows contributors to play down the 
impact of the sustainability factor by means of the following alternatives: 
·  extension of professional life beyond the minimum requirements for receiving a 
full pension; 
·  voluntary contribution to a public or private capitalization scheme, in order to 
complement the pension amount.  
However,  these  alternatives  are  disregarded  in  the  simulation  exercise.  As 
before, it is assumed that individuals retire as soon as they fulfil the requirements to 
warrant a full pension, therefore accepting the penalty imposed by the sustainability 
factor.  
   The figures for the average life expectancy at the age of 65 were taken from the 
mortality tables underlying the exercise presented in Pinheiro and Cunha (2007).
28 They 
allow  the  computation  of  the  sustainability  factor  applicable  to  the  amount  of  the 
statutory pension for each year, from 2008 onwards (see Chart 24). It is noticeable that 
the factor’s relevance increases as the retirement year gets further from 2008, since, 













Chart 25 presents the reduction in the pensions awarded each year (the retirees 
are grouped by retirement year under the current legislation), as a consequence of the 
introduction of the sustainability factor. From now on, all public employees registered 
in the CGA are analysed as a whole, whatever the enrolment date or the applicable 
                                                 
28 Pinheiro M. e V. Cunha (2007), “MISS: A model for assessing the sustainability of public social security in 
Portugal”, Banco de Portugal – Occasional Papers, no. 2. 
Chart 24 
SUSTAINABILITY FACTOR BY RETIREMENT 
YEAR AND GENDER 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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regime. A decrease in the average initial pension, approximately until 2034, results from 
the  implementation  of  the  new  legislation,  when  the  sustainability  factor  is  not 
considered.  From  that  year  on,  the  opposite  occurs,  as  the  pensions  awarded  to 
employees registered since September 1993 - which tend to be higher under the new 
legal framework - become dominant as shown in Chart 15. 
As expected, the introduction of the sustainability factor has a negative impact 
on  the  initial  pension  of  all  CGA  members  and  it  becomes  more  marked  as  life 
expectancy increases over time. This impact converges to about 20 per cent, and clearly 
surpasses the one arising from the other legislative changes in force since January 2006. 
Taking into account the overall effect of the changes in the computing formulas and 

















4.4. The impact of the reform on pension-related expenditure 
In order to estimate the overall savings deriving from the reform of the Estatuto 
da  Aposentação,  pension  outlays  for  the  retirees  considered  in  this  study  were 
simulated, using both the previous and the current legislation. The number of  years 
during which each individual receives an old-age pension was computed on the basis of 
life expectancy at retirement according to gender and age (using Pinheiro and Cunha’s 
projections). Taking into account the legislation in force  up to December 2005, the 
Chart 25 
RELATIVE IMPACT OF THE LEGISLATIVE REFORM ON THE 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: Negative figures mean increases in the average initial pension. 
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retirees receive their pension for 23 years on average. Considering the rules in force 
since January 2006, this value decreases to 21 years. Pension-related expenditure was 
calculated for each year, from 2007 until the system’s predictable closure. Then these 
annual amounts were accumulated (note that they are at 2005 constant prices - see sub-
section 3.2.2).
29 Chart 26 presents the savings that derive from the introduction of the 
new legal framework, both in annual and cumulative terms, excluding the impact of the 
sustainability factor. In order to provide a relative measure of the respective magnitudes, 


















The reform brings about a decline in pension-related expenditure. The resulting 
saving reaches its maximum between 2015 and 2030. From 2040 onwards,  expenditure 
slightly increases, mostly reflecting the fact that pensions computed in line with the 
more  recent  rules  will  have  been,  on  average,  higher  since  the  previous  decade  (as 
shown in Chart 25). The saving obtained is predominantly explained by the decline in 
the number of years during which the retirees receive their pensions. 
                                                 
29 It was assumed that the pensions (at 2005 prices) remain constant once they begin to be paid. 
30 The value so obtained is different from the one that would result from dividing each year’s saving, expressed at that 
year’s prices, by the respective GDP. This difference depends, particularly, on the discrepancy between the nominal 
variation  in  the  compensations  underlying  the  pension  calculations  and  the  nominal  change  in  GDP,  occurring 
throughout the time horizon considered relatively to 2005.   
Chart 26 
ANNUAL SAVING ON THE PENSION-RELATED EXPENDITURE 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 38 
In  Chart  27  it  is  noticeable  that  the  introduction  of  the  sustainability  factor 
sharpens the decline in annual pension-related expenditure, which now lasts over the 
















5. Concluding remarks 
  This paper attempts to evaluate the effects of the recent revision of the Estatuto 
da Aposentação. Firstly, the profile of retirements and the initial old-age pensions were 
simulated, both in line with the previous legislation and the current one, in force since 
January 2006 (using the “2005 Public Administration Human Resources Database”). 
Secondly, the impact of the sustainability factor on the initial pensions was taken into 
account and the effect of the legislative reform on CGA expenditure was gauged. 
As  expected,  the  reform  of  the  Estatuto  da  Aposentação  results  in  the 
postponement of retirement (with a full pension) for most of the general CGA regime 
contributors.  This  effect  is  particularly  marked  for  employees  enrolled  until  August 
1993. For the employees enrolled in the special CGA regimes, the moment of retirement 
tends to be more affected as a result of the reduction or gradual elimination of the 
bonuses applying to the computation of the career-length. 
  In  terms  of  the  initial  pension  amount,  the  legislative  reform  has  more 
heterogeneous impacts. For most of the contributors enrolled until August 1993, the 
Chart 27 
ANNUAL SAVING ON PENSION-RELATED EXPENDITURE RESULTING FROM 
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 39 
revision of the retirement conditions and calculation formulas has negative effects on 
pensions. However, in some cases, the extension of career-length (including or not a 
bonus) determines a higher initial pension, compared with the amount that would be 
obtained in terms of the previous legislation. For the majority of the employees of the 
general CGA regime enrolled since September 1993 the effects are approximately nil. 
For about 20 per cent of the contributors pension slightly rises, as a consequence of the 
increase in the reference compensation, in line with the extension of career-length (in 
this  case,  in  order  to  fulfil  the  new  minimum  age  required  to  obtain  a  penalty-free 
pension). For most contributors of the special regimes, the reduction or elimination of 
the  bonuses  results  in  a  relatively  stronger  rise  in  actual  career-length  and, 
consequentially, in the reference compensations. This effect tends to cause an increase 
in the pension computed under the legal framework in force since January 2006. 
  The decline in the number of years during which retirees receive their old-age 
pension  in  addition  to  the  introduction  of  the  sustainability  factor  generates  a  non-
negligible  decrease  in  pension-related  expenditure,  throughout  the  period  until  the 
system closes.   
To sum up, the reform of the Estatuto da Aposentação results in an extension of 
the time served and in a reduction in pension-related expenditure that are in line with 
the reason for its implementation. In practice, the delay in the moment of retirement and 
savings may be less marked than the simulation results suggest, since, as mentioned, a 
significant number of employees retire before fulfilling the requirements assumed. As 
for the sustainability factor, it should be remembered that its impact at the individual 
level  may  be  played  down  through  the  alternatives  legally  set  out  for  that  purpose. 
These were not considered in this exercise. Moreover, the profile of retirements is likely 
to  be  very  influenced  in  the  coming  years  by  the  recent  change  to  the  Estatuto  da 
Aposentação, which has shortened the minimum career-length required for retirement 
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Appendix  2  –  Retirement  conditions  and  pension  calculation  rules 
under the new legal framework  
 


































60.5 years January 1, 2006 - December 31, 2006
61 years January 1, 2007 - December 31, 2007
61.5 years January 1, 2008 - December 31, 2008
62 years January 1, 2009 - December 31, 2009
62.5 years January 1, 2010 - December 31, 2010
63 years January 1, 2011 - December 31, 2011
63.5 years January 1, 2012 - December 31, 2012
64 years January 1, 2013 - December 31, 2013
64.5 years January 1, 2014 - December 31, 2014
65 years From January 1, 2015 onwards
Transitional Period Age
 
Source: Law No. 60/2005. 
Table 2.1.2 
Career-length equivalent to a full contributory 
career 
36.5 years January 1, 2006 - December 31, 2006
37 years January 1, 2007 - December 31, 2007
37.5 years January 1, 2008 - December 31, 2008
38 years January 1, 2009 - December 31, 2009
38.5 years January 1, 2010 - December 31, 2010
39 years January 1, 2011 - December 31, 2011
39.5 years January 1, 2012 - December 31, 2012





Source: Law No. 60/2005. 
Note: Also applicable to the security forces personnel. 
Table 2.2.1 
Requirements to access pre-retirement 















































































Retirement age: primary education and 
kindergarten teachers 
 
55.5 years January 1, 2006 - December 31, 2006
56 years January 1, 2007 - December 31, 2007
56.5 years January 1, 2008 - December 31, 2008
57 years January 1, 2009 - December 31, 2009
57.5 years January 1, 2010 - December 31, 2010
58 years January 1, 2011 - December 31, 2011
58.5 years January 1, 2012 - December 31, 2012
59 years January 1, 2013 - December 31, 2013
59.5 years January 1, 2014 - December 31, 2014
60.25 years January 1, 2015 - December 31, 2015
61 years January 1, 2016 - December 31, 2016
61.75 years January 1, 2017 - December 31, 2017
62.5 years January 1, 2018 - December 31, 2018
63.25 years January 1, 2019 - December 31, 2019
64 years January 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020
64.75 years January 1, 2021 - December 31, 2021
65 years
Age Transitional Period
From January 1, 2022 onwards  
 
Source: Decree-Law No. 229/2005. 
Table 2.2.3 
Career-length equivalent to a full contributory 
career: primary education and kindergarten 
teachers 
 
30.5 years January 1, 2006 - December 31, 2006
31 years January 1, 2007 - December 31, 2007
31.5 years January 1, 2008 - December 31, 2008
32 years January 1, 2009 - December 31, 2009
32.5 years January 1, 2010 - December 31, 2010
33 years January 1, 2011 - December 31, 2011
33.5 years January 1, 2012 - December 31, 2012
34 years January 1, 2013 - December 31, 2013
34.5 years January 1, 2014 - December 31, 2014
35.25 years January 1, 2015 - December 31, 2015
36 years January 1, 2016 - December 31, 2016
36.5 years January 1, 2017 - December 31, 2017
37 years January 1, 2018 - December 31, 2018
37.5 years January 1, 2019 - December 31, 2019
38 years January 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020
38.5 years January 1, 2021 - December 31, 2021






Source: Decree-Law No. 229/2005. 
Table 2.2.4 
Retirement age: nurses 
 
57.5 years January 1, 2006 - December 31, 2006
58 years January 1, 2007 - December 31, 2007
58.5 years January 1, 2008 - December 31, 2008
59 years January 1, 2009 - December 31, 2009
59.5 years January 1, 2010 - December 31, 2010
60 years January 1, 2011 - December 31, 2011
60.5 years January 1, 2012 - December 31, 2012
61 years January 1, 2013 - December 31, 2013
61.5 years January 1, 2014 - December 31, 2014
62.25 years January 1, 2015 - December 31, 2015
63 years January 1, 2016 - December 31, 2016
63.75 years January 1, 2017 - December 31, 2017
64.5 years January 1, 2018 - December 31, 2018




Source: Decree-Law No. 229/2005. 
 
Table 2.2.5 
Career-length equivalent to a full contributory career: 
nurses 
 
35.5 years January 1, 2006 - December 31, 2006
36 years January 1, 2007 - December 31, 2007
36.5 years January 1, 2008 - December 31, 2008
37 years January 1, 2009 - December 31, 2009
37.5 years January 1, 2010 - December 31, 2010
38 years January 1, 2011 - December 31, 2011
38.5 years January 1, 2012 - December 31, 2012
39 years January 1, 2013 - December 31, 2013
39.5 years January 1, 2014 - December 31, 2014





Source: Decree-Law No. 229/2005. 44 




















Definition of the reference components indexed to the IAS (or the mandatory 
minimum wage, when applicable)   
 
1st Component Until 1.1 x IAS 2.30%
2nd Component Between 1.1x IAS and 2 x IAS 2.25%
3rd Component Between 2x IAS and 4 x IAS 2.20%
4th Component Between 4 x IAS and 8 x IAS 2.10%
5th Component Higher than 8 x IAS 2.00%
Components Reference compensation
Annual accrual rate 
of pension
 
Source: Decree-Law No. 187/2007. WORKING PAPERS
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